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Abstract
In this work, we study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium. Our main
result gives an algorithm which can compute an approximate Walrasian equilibrium in
an exchange economy with general, but well-behaved utility functions, in time that is
polynomial in the number of goods when the number of agents is held constant. This
result has applications to macroeconomics and finance, where applications of Walrasian
equilibrium theory tend to deal with many goods but a fixed number of agents.
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1 Introduction
The problem of computing Walrasian equilibria has been studied over multiple decades.
The earliest studies include Scarf (1977) and Todd (1976); but the literature has been
reinvigorated by the recent efforts of the computer science community. Some recent sur-
veys include Vazirani (2007), Codenotti and Varadarajan (2007), and Codenotti, Pem-
maraju, and Varadarajan (2004).
The basic message that has emerged from the literature is negative: computing a
Walrasian equilibrium tends to be “hard” for general settings. For example, Chen, Dai,
Du, and Teng (2009) prove that finding a Walrasian equilibrium is hard (PPAD-complete
and hard to approximate) even in economies with piece-wise linear concave utilities that
are separable by goods. Similarly, Codenotti, Saberi, Varadarajan, and Ye (2006) prove
that the problem is also hard in economies in which agents have Leontief preferences.1
In contrast, for more limited settings, there exist positive results. In particular, there
are studies presenting computationally tractable instances of Walrasian equilibrium, but
they require very special assumptions on the markets in question. For example, the
results assume that the economies satisfy the gross substitutes condition, or that all
utilities are linear, or of the CES functional form (with certain values of the CES param-
eter) (Devanur, Papadimitriou, Saberi, and Vazirani, 2002; Codenotti, Pemmaraju, and
Varadarajan, 2005; Jain, 2004).2 Other results focus on economies with a representative
∗We thanks Chris Umans for his advice on our paper. Echenique is affiliated with the Division of
Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology; Wierman is affiliated with Computers
and Mathematical Sciences, California Institute of Technology; emails: fede,adamw@caltech.edu
1We emphasize that Codenotti, Saberi, Varadarajan, and Ye (2006) reduce arbitrary two-player
games, in which one player has n strategies and the other has m strategies, into an economy with n+m
agents and goods. Thus they consider problems in which both goods and agents grow at the same rate.
2Segal (2007) presents positive results on the communication complexity of equilibria.
agent, through the device of a Fisher equilibrium (Jain and Vazirani, 2007). These re-
sults are deep and ingenious, but the assumptions placed on their models leave out most
economic applications of general equilibrium theory.
As is evident from the above, there is a gap between the generality of the hardness
results and the specificity of the instances for which finding an equilibrium is tractable.
The goal of the current work is to find a middle ground where computing a Walrasian
equilibrium is tractable, but which can still capture settings that include economic ap-
plications of the theory.
To that end, our focus is on the setting of many goods but a fixed number of agents.
Our main result (Theorem 1) exhibits an algorithm for finding an approximate Walrasian
equilibrium that runs in polynomial-time in the number of goods when the number of
agents is fixed. Importantly, our result applies to general, but well-behaved, utility
functions (see Section 2.1) and to settings where there are infinitely many agents but
where the number of “types” of agents is fixed (Section 3).
The restriction to a fixed number of agents still allows many applications in eco-
nomics. Specifically, general equilibrium theory is used very heavily in macroeconomics
and finance. In fact, currently, most applications of the theory are in these two areas. In
these settings, the theory is applied to large economies, in the sense of having infinitely
many goods, but the number of agents remains fixed. This is because, in macroeconomic
and financial applications, the time horizon is usually infinite, which implies that there
are infinitely many different goods. Additionally, there is often uncertainty, which gives
rise to an infinite dimensional commodity space. On the other hand, the models typically
assume finitely many (long-lived) agents or types of agents.
We emphasize macro and finance models because it is hard to doubt the importance
of the computational complexity of a model; and researchers in these fields very often
need algorithms to find equilibria. The relevance of complexity for actual economies,
and for economics, is not guaranteed, as we explain elsewhere (Echenique, Golovin, and
Wierman, 2011).
Macro and finance aside, one may still be interested in economies with both a large
number of goods and agents. Our results are still applicable, as long as the heterogeneity
of the agents is limited. Perhaps the most interesting limitation of heterogeneity is an
economy with “endowment classes:” agents are fully heterogeneous in their preferences
but not in their sources of income. In such a “class society,” endowments can be classified
into a fixed number of types, and as a consequence agents belong to different classes
depending on how they derive their incomes. If, additionally, utilities are homothetic,
we can aggregate consumers into a representative consumer for each class, and thus
effectively assume that there are fixed number of agents. We explain in the paper how
2
this procedure generates the model of Fisher equilibria, which has received attention
recently in the literature on computing equilibria (as discussed above). As a consequence,
our algorithm finds Fisher equilibria efficiently.
The closest paper in the literature to ours is Deng, Papadimitriou, and Safra (2002a),
who show that the problem of finding Walrasian equilibrium is easy when the number of
agents is bounded and utilities are linear. Our result does not assume that utilities are
linear, but instead only requires them to be concave and rule out boundary solutions to
the consumers’ maximization problem (see the discussion on page 5).
2 Main result
We study the standard model of an exchange economy with n agents and l goods. In
such a model, agents are endowed with non-negative quantities of each good; they derive
income from selling their endowments at the prevailing prices; and use the income to
purchase a consumption bundle. In a model of an exchange economy, all economic
activity reduces to pure barter, and there is no production of new goods. Our results,
however, extend naturally to economies with production. We would simply need to
assume that firms’ production technologies are convex.
Before discussing our result, we introduce the basic notation and definitions for the
model.
2.1 Basic definitions
We adopt the following notational conventions: Rm+ denotes the positive orthant of the
m-dimensional Euclidean space; Rm++ is the set of vectors of R
m that are strictly positive
in all its components. We use the norm defined as ‖x‖ = supi |xi|, and understand the
distance between two vectors x and y to be ‖x− y‖.
A function u : Rm+ → R is C1 if there is an open set U ⊇ Rm+ and a function
f : U → R that is differentiable and has a continuous derivative, such that f and u
coincide on Rm+ . The following definitions will be useful: Say that u is
• monotonic if x ≤ y and x 6= y imply that u(x) < u(y);
• (strictly) quasiconcave if for any x, y ∈ Rm+ , x 6= y and α ∈ (0, 1), u(x) ≤ u(y) ⇒
u(x)(<) ≤ u(αx+ (1− α)y);
• concave if for any x, y ∈ Rm+ , x 6= y and α ∈ (0, 1), αu(x) + (1 − α)u(y) ≤
u(αx+ (1− α)y);
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• homothetic if for any x, y ∈ Rl+, u(y) = u(x) implies that u(αy) = u(αx), for all
scalar α ∈ R+.
An exchange economy is a tuple (ωi, ui)
n
i=1 where ωi ∈ Rl+ and ui : Rl+ → R. The
number l is the number of goods in the economy. The number of agents is n, and each
one is characterized by two objects: a vector of endowments ωi, and a utility function ui.
An allocation in (ωi, ui)
n
i=1 is a vector x ∈ Rnl+ for which
∑n
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 ωi.
A Walrasian equilibrium in (ωi, ui)
n
i=1 is a pair (p, x) where
1. p ∈ Rl++, i.e., a price vector,
2. x = (xi)
n
i=1 ∈ Rnl+ is an allocation, i.e., supply equals demand,
3. and, for all i, p · ωi = p · xi, and
ui(y) > ui(xi)⇒ p · y > p · xi,
i.e., agents maximize utility when consuming xi.
2.2 Main result
The main result of this paper is to present an algorithm that computes an approximation
of a Walrasian equilibrium in time that is polynomial in the number of goods when the
number of agents is fixed.
Before presenting the result, we first describe what we mean by an approximation of
a Walrasian equilibrium. Then we describe the assumptions that we impose on exchange
economies, and state our results.
An approximate equilibrium consists of a price and an allocation in which agents are
utility maximizing, supply equals demand, and agents’ expenditures are approximately
equal their incomes. Formally, A Walrasian ε-equilibrium is a pair (p, x) where p ∈ Rl+,
x is an allocation, and for all i
ui(y) > ui(xi)⇒ p · y > p · xi
and |p · ωi − p · xi| < ε.One can, instead, desire the approximation to imply ε-maximization,
or that expenditure equals income but supply is only approximately equal to demand.
As we explain in Section 2.3, our approach is useful for those kinds of approximations as
well.
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The class of exchange economies that we consider is defined as follows. Let E be a
family of exchange economies. Each economy (ui, ωi)
n
i=1 in E has the same number of
agents, n. They may differ in the number of goods. We assume that all economies in E
satisfy the following conditions:
1. (all goods exist)
∑n
i=1 ωi ∈ Rl++;
2. (regular utilities) ui is C
1, concave, and strictly monotonic;
3. (boundary condition) If x ∈ Rl+, y ∈ Rl++, and for some good s, xs = 0, then
u(x) < u(y);
4. (normalization) for all x ∈ Rnl+ such that
∑n
i=1 ωi =
∑n
i=1 xi, ui(x) ∈ [0, 1].
Our assumptions on E deserve some discussion. The assumptions placed on utilities
are ubiquitous in economic models. Many general equilibrium models assume that util-
ities are regular, and an “Inada” condition equivalent to our boundary condition: the
role of this is assumption is to rule out that agents’ optimal consumption choice has zero
consumption of some goods. The normalization assumption puts a uniform bound on
utilities evaluated within an allocation.3 Concavity is stronger than the assumption of
quasiconcavity in textbook treatments of general equilibrium theory, but still commonly
assumed in applications. Concavity is a requirement of our analysis in two ways: First,
concavity is required by the Negishi approach for proving existence, which is the basis of
our analysis. Second, we also use concavity to bound the degree of approximation in our
algorithm away from the number of goods. It is fair to say that our assumptions coincide
with the hypotheses of the Second Welfare Theorem (a crucial ingredient for us), with a
strengthening of quasiconcavity to concavity of utilities.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1. Let ε > 0. There is an algorithm that, for any economy in E, finds a
Walrasian ε-equilibrium in time polynomial in l when n is fixed.
2.3 Other notions of approximate equilibrium
It is important to note that approximations of Walrasian equilibria have been studied
before. The recent literature on CS and economics focuses, understandably, on approxi-
mate equilibria since exact equilibria can only have approximate discrete analogues. The
older literature on general equilibrium theory in economics also looks at approximations
of equilibria, for completely different reasons. Our notion of Walrasian ε-equilibrium is
3Note that this bound is not global, only over the bundles achieved in some allocation.
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somewhat different from the notions studied before and so it is important to relate it to
those notions.
We now show how, with a small modification, our algorithm finds approximations
that are similar to the ones studied in the CS/Econ literature, as well as in the general
equilibrium literature from the 60s and 70s.
The first definition of approximation seeks to relax how exactly consumers optimize.
It imposes ε-maximization of utility: Let ε > 0. An ε-approximate equilibrium in an
exchange economy (ui, ωi)
n
i=1 is a pair (p, x) where p ∈ Rl+, x is an allocation, and for all
i
p · y ≤ p · ωi ⇒ ui(y) ≤ ui(xi) + ε,
and |p · ωi − p · xi| < ε.
The notion of ε-approximate equilibrium is close to the one studied in Deng, Papadim-
itriou, and Safra (2002b). They require that the consumers are ε-maximizing utility when
consuming the bundles mandated by the equilibrium, but they assume that demand is
only approximately equal to supply. In our definition, demand is exactly equal to supply.
On the other hand, in our definition consumers are only approximately spending their
incomes.4
If we relax the requirement that demand equals supply, we obtain the following notion
of approximate equilibrium, which is similar in spirit (but stronger) to the one in Starr
(1969).
An strong ε-approximate equilibrium in an exchange economy (ui, ωi)
n
i=1 is a pair (p, x)
where p ∈ Rl+, x ∈ Rnl+ with ‖
∑
i xi −
∑
i ωi‖ < ε, and for all i
p · y ≤ p · ωi ⇒ ui(y) ≤ ui(xi),
and p · ωi = p · xi.
We need to impose an additional assumption on the economies in E. Suppose that
there is Θ > 0 and pi > 0 such that, for all (ui, ωi)
n
i=1 in E,
sup
p∈∆
(
p ·
n∑
i=1
ωi
)
≤ Θ,
and if x is an allocation in (ui, ωi)
n
i=1, then Dsui(xi) > pi. The first component of
the assumption simply rules our arbitrarily large endowments. The number of different
goods in the economies in E may grow, but the total “mass” in the economy must remain
4Approximate budget exhaustion is assumed in part of the literature on core convergence, see for
example Anderson (1978).
6
bounded. When endowments are bounded, it is easy to see that marginal utilities must
be bounded below (using condition 3 in the definition of E). We require that the bound,
pi, be uniform across the economies in E.
The role of the bound Θ is to control how small the welfare weights in an economy
may be (see Lemma 7 in the proof of Theorem 2). Using both bounds, Θ and pi, we can
also control how small prices can be in equilibrium. These two magnitudes: the bounds
on welfare weights and prices, lie behind the following result.
Theorem 2. Let ε > 0. There is an algorithm that, for any economy in E, finds an
ε-approximate equilibrium, and a strong ε-approximate equilibrium, in time polynomial
in l.
3 Applications to replica economies, representative
consumers, endowment classes, and Fisher equi-
libria
We have presented our main result (Theorem 1) in a context with a fixed number of
agents, but it also has applications more generally. As we emphasized in the introduction,
many economic models assume that there are many goods, but a fixed number of agents.
It is nonetheless very interesting to study economies with a large number of agents as
well as goods. In this section we limit agent heterogeneity in ways that are a bit more
subtle than assuming there is a fixed number of them. But, in all these cases, we show
that when agent heterogeneity is limited, finding a Walrasian equilibrium is easy.
First, and most immediately, our result applies directly to “replica economies:” these
are economies with many agents, where each agent is a copy of some prototypical (small)
set of types of agents. Replica economies is one of the most important model of large
economies in economics. It plays a fundamental role in results on core convergence.5 For
our purposes, however, the model is more restrictive than we need for our result to apply.
Next, we adopt at the (arguably realistic) idea that agents may be fully heterogeneous
in their preferences, but not in their endowments.
In our second class of models, we discuss the existence of a representative consumer.
We give a sufficient condition for an economy to admit a representative consumer, and
observe that our result immediately gives an algorithm for approximating Walrasian equi-
libria. Clearly, representative consumers only exist under very stringent assumptions, but
5See Chapter 18 in MasColell, Whinston, and Green (1995). The theorem by Debreu and Scarf is
one of the most beautiful results in general equilibrium theory; see Debreu and Scarf (1963).
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there are nevertheless many important models in economics that assume their existence
(famously, many models in macroeconomics assume a representative consumer).
The most important instance of representative consumers may correspond to Fisher
equilibria. Some of the most positive recent results on the complexity of economic models
have been related to Fisher equilibria (Jain and Vazirani (2007)). We show that the
results on Fisher equilibria are a special case of our result, the reason being that their
models are essentially models of a representative consumer.
In third place, we assume that an economy may have many agents but that each
of them belongs to one of a small number of “endowment classes.” For example, some
agents are laborers (endowed with labor), while others are endowed with land, and others
with capital. If we can partition agents into a small number of classes, then—together
with a strengthening of our assumption on preferences—we can in effect work with a
model with a small number of agents, even if the actual number is large. The idea we are
trying to exploit is that consumers may be heterogeneous in their preferences, but not in
their sources of income. Under homotheticity, we can invoke some classical aggregation
theorems to effectively work with a small set of agents.
3.1 Replica economies
We present a direct application of our result to a model with an unbounded number of
agents and replica economies. The main purpose of this section is to flesh out the idea
that, in a world with limited heterogeneity on the part of agents, approximate Walrasian
equilibria may be easy to find.
Consider an exchange economy (ωi, ui)
n
i=1 under the assumptions we established in
Section 2. The Kth replica of (ωi, ui)
n
i=1 is the exchange economy (ωi,k, ui,k)i=1,...,n,k=1,...,K
where for all i, j and k we have that ωik = ωjk and uik = ujk. In a replica economy,
each agent is indexed by a pair of numbers i and k: i denotes the “type” of agent and k
denotes the “serial number” of the agent, among those of his type.
It is trivial to verify that a Walrasian ε-equilibrium of (ωi, ui)
n
i=1 is also a Walrasian
ε-equilibrium of (ωi,k, ui,k)i=1,...,n,k=1,...,K , for any k.
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Our algorithm gives an approximate Walrasian equilibrium of (ωi, ui)
n
i=1. This is also
an approximate Walrasian equilibrium of (ωi,k, ui,k)i=1,...,n,k=1,...,K , for any K.
6The mode is used to establish that the core of the replicated economies is, in the limit, equal to the
set of Walrasian equilibrium allocation of the original economy (ωi, ui)ni=1.
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3.2 Representative consumers and Fisher equilibria
Consider a collection of n agents. We shall assume that each one of them has a continuous,
strictly monotone, and strictly quasiconcave utility function ui. Let di(p,m) denote the
solution to the problem of maximizing ui over xi ∈ Rl+ such that p ·xi ≤ m; the function
di is the demand function generated by ui.
Theorem (Samuelson’s Aggregation Theorem). Let W : Rn → R be strictly in-
creasing. If, for every p, ω ∈ Rl++, δ∗1(p, ω), . . . , δ∗n(p, ω) solves the problem
max
δ∈∆
W (u1(d1(p, p · δ1ω)), . . . , un(dn(p, p · δnω))) ;
then there is a continuous, strictly monotonic and concave function u, generating a de-
mand function d such that
d(p, p · ω) =
n∑
i=1
di(p, p · δ∗i (p, ω)ω),
for all p, ω ∈ Rl++. Further, u takes the form
u(x) =
maxW (u1(x1), . . . , un(xn))
s.t.
∑
i xi = x.
Corollary 3. Fix α1, . . . , αn ∈ ∆ and suppose that ui is homothetic, in addition to the
previously made assumptions. Then the utility function u defined by
u(x) =
max Π(ui(xi))
αi
s.t.
∑
i xi = x.
generates a demand function d such that
d(p, p · ω) =
n∑
i=1
di(p, p · δ∗i (p, ω)ω),
for all p, ω ∈ Rl++.
Given a set of n agents, with continuous, homothetic, monotone and strictly concave
utility functions ui, we can define a Fisher equilibrium as follows. Suppose there is 1
units of each of l goods, and that each agent i is endowed with αi units of “money” (unit
of account). Let 1 =
∑
i αi. Then a Fisher equilibrium is a vector of prices p ∈ ∆ such
that ∑
i
di(p, αi) = (1, . . . , 1)
(that is, supply equals demand).
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Now, a Fisher equilibrium is a special case of a Walrasian equilibrium in a model in
which there is a representative consumer. By Corollary 3, if ω = (1, . . . , 1) then a price
vector p is a Fisher equilibrium if and only if it is a Walrasian equilibrium in the economy
with a single (representative) consumer, with utility function u as defined in Corollary 3.
Since this is an economy with a single consumer, our Theorem 1 delivers a fast algorithm
for approximating Walrasian equilibria.
Corollary 3 is a result due to Eisenberg (1961), and used in the literature on Fisher
equilibria. The connection between Fisher equilibria and the Negishi approach is already
remarked upon in Codenotti and Varadarajan (2007).
3.3 Fixed endowment classes
Consider a collection E of exchange economies (ωi, ui)
n
i=1. Suppose now that both n and
the number of goods can differ among the members of E. Assume that utilities and
endowments satisfy all the assumptions of Section 2, and that in addition utilities are
homothetic.
We limit the heterogeneity among agents in E by limiting how endowments differ
among agents. For an exchange economy (ωi, ui)
n
i=1, an endowment class is a set P ⊆
{1, . . . , n}, together with vectors ω ∈ Rl+ and (αi)i∈P such that αi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈P αi = 1, and
ωi = αiω. Now, suppose that there is a fixed number K such that for every (ωi, ui)
n
i=1 in
E, there are at most K endowment classes that partition the set of agents {1, . . . , n}.
By Corollary 3, the homotheticity of utilities allow for the existence of a representative
consumer for each of the K endowment classes. We can now find a Walrasian equilibrium
for the economy populated by such representative consumers. From an equilibrium allo-
cation and prices, one finds a final equilibrium allocation by solving the convex problem
in Samuelson’s Theorem. There is a fixed number of such problems to solve.
4 Proofs
We now present the proof of Theorem 1. Note that throughout the following we assume
that for any concave maximization problem in Rl there is an algorithm that finds a
solution in time polynomial in l. Thus, we are in effect reducing the calculation of a Wal-
rasian equilibrium to a polynomial number of concave maximization. Importantly, these
maximizations must be solved approximately; however we ignore this for the exposition
in order to improve its clarity.
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The key idea in the proof is to make use of the Negishi approach for proving existence
of Walrasian equilibrium. We outline the Negishi approach and explain how we need to
adapt it before proceeding with the proof.
4.0.1 Proof overview: the Negishi approach
Negishi’s approach to equilibrium existence consists of exploiting the Second Welfare
Theorem (SWT) to prove the existence of equilibria. We need the following definition:
An Walrasian equilibrium with transfers is a triple (p, x, T ), where:
• p ∈ Rl+ (a vector of prices);
• T ∈ Rn and ∑ni=1 Ti = 0 (a vector of transfers);
• x is an allocation (supply equals demand);
• for all i
ui(y) > ui(xi)⇒ p · y > p · ωi + Ti
and p · xi = p · ωi + Ti (agents are maximizing utility).
Note that a Walrasian equilibrium in the usual sense is just a Walrasian equilibrium
with transfers (p, x, T ) in which T = 0; and that a Walrasian ε-equilibrium is one where
‖T‖ ≤ ε.
Negishi (1960) proceeds by using welfare weights as stand-in for Pareto optimal al-
locations. For every vector of weights (λ1, . . . , λn), where λi is the weight on agent i,
the SWT establishes the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with transfers (p, x, T ) in
which x maximizes
∑
i λiui(xi). One can then map λ into a vector of welfare weights that
tries to “undo” the compensations introduced by the transfers T : these welfare weights
would seek to reward agents who have transfers Ti < 0 and punish agents with transfers
Ti > 0. Such a map will not have a fixed point λ for which the corresponding transfers
are not all zero: it “moves” all λ with positive or negative transfers.
Negishi then uses Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to establish the existence of a “neu-
tral” vector of welfare weights: weights that induce zero transfers. The crucial feature of
his approach is that the fixed point argument is done in a space of dimension n, not l.7
We adopt the main idea in Negishi’s approach, but we need to deal with several
complications. First, Kakutani’s fixed point theorem is not constructive. Instead we
7For this reason is has been used in the study of Walrasian equilibrium with infinite dimensional
commodity spaces. See, for example, Bewley (1991), Magill (1981) or Mas-Colell (1986).
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base our algorithm on Sperner’s lemma, the combinatorial underpinning of Kakutani’s
(and Brouwer’s) theorem. In particular, we look directly for zero T , and do not explicitly
use a fixed-point argument (although these ideas are related, of course).
Second, and more importantly, as the number of goods changes, the mapping from
welfare weights to transfers can change in ways that are difficult to control. Our algorithm
needs to be robust to such changes: this is perhaps the main difficulty in applying
Negishi’s approach as a computational devise. Here we exploit the concavity of utilities
to obtain a Lipschitz bound on the mapping from welfare weights to transfers. The bound
allows us to approximate zero transfers in a way that is independent of the number of
goods in the economy. The number of goods only enters the problem when one obtains a
Walrasian equilibrium with transfers for given welfare weights, and we only perform this
computation a fixed number of times.
4.0.2 Overview of Sperner’s lemma
The following is copied from Border (1989) with very minor adaptations.
A collection of vectors x0, . . . , xm in R
n is affinely independent if
∑m
i=0 θixi = 0 and∑m
i=0 θi = 0 implies that θ0 = θ1 = . . . = θm = 0
A m-simplex is the set of all strictly positive convex combinations of an affinely
independent set of m + 1 vectors. A closed m-simplex is the convex hull of an affinely
independent set of m+ 1 vectors. Given the affinely independent vectors x0, . . . , xm, the
simplex ∆(x0, . . . , xm) is the set
∆(x0, . . . , xm) =
{
m∑
i=0
θixi : θi > 0, i = 0, . . . ,m;
m∑
i=0
θi = 1
}
.
Here, each xi is a vertex of ∆(x0, . . . , xm) and each k-simplex ∆(xi0 , . . . , xik) is a face
of ∆(x0, . . . , xm). The diameter of a simplex is the largest distance between any two of
its vertexes.
For each y =
∑m
i=0 θixi in the closure of ∆(x0, . . . , xm), let χ(y) = {i : θi > 0}. Note
that if χ(y) = {i0, . . . , ik} then y ∈ ∆(xi0 , . . . , xik).
Denote by ei the vector in R
n which has all its coordinates 0, except for a 1 in its ith
coordinate. The standard n-simplex is the simplex ∆(e1, . . . , en), denoted simply as ∆.
Note that
∆ = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0 ∧
∑
i
xi = 1}.
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A simplicial subdivision of ∆ is a collection A1, . . . , AJ of simplexes such that ∆ =
∪Jj=1Aj and for each j 6= h Aj ∩Ah is either empty or the closure of a common face. The
mesh of a simplicial subdivision is the largest diameter of any its simplexes.
Fix a simplicial subdivision A1, . . . , AJ of ∆. Let V denote the collection of all the
vertices of A1, . . . , AJ . A function f : V → {1, . . . , n} for which f(v) ∈ χ(v) for all v ∈ V
is called a proper labeling of the simplicial subdivision.
Theorem (Sperner’s Lemma). Let A1, . . . , AJ be a simplicial subdivision of ∆, and
f a proper labeling of this subdivision. Then there is (an odd number of) Aj such that f
achieves all the values {1, . . . , n} on the vertices of Aj.
See Border (1989) for a proof of Sperner’s lemma. A simplex Aj for which f achieves
all the values {1, . . . , n} is called completely labeled.
4.0.3 Three simple lemmas.
Let ε > 0. We shall work with the norm ‖x‖ = supi |xi|.
For each λ ∈ ∆, consider the problem Π(λ):
max
∑n
i=1 λiui(xi)
s.t.
{∑n
i=1 xi ≤
∑n
i=1 ωi
xi ≥ 0.
Let x(λ) be a solution to the above problem. Since λ ∈ ∆ there is at least one h with
λh > 0. By the Inada condition, we have that xh(λ) ∈ Rl++. Let
p(λ) = λhDui(xh(λ)).
Note that the first-order conditions of the problem Π(λ) imply that the definition of p(λ)
does not depend on the chosen consumer h with λh > 0. Define, for all i,
Ti(λ) = p(λ) · (xi(λ)− ωi).
Define function g : ∆→ Rn by g(λ)i = Ti(λ).
Lemma 4. For λ, λ′ ∈ ∆, ‖g(λ)− g(λ′)‖ ≤ (n− 1)‖λ− λ′‖.
Proof. The concavity of ui implies that Dui(x)(ω−x) ≥ u(ω)−u(x) (Rockafellar (1970)
Theorem 23.2), so
Ti(λ) = p(λ) · (xi(λ)− ωi)
= λiDui(xi(λ))(xi(λ)− ω)
≤ λi(ui(xi(λ))− ui(ωi)) ≤ λi(M −m).
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On the other hand,
∑
j Tj(λ) = 0 so
Ti(λ) = −
∑
j 6=i
Tj(λ) ≥ −
∑
j 6=i
(M −m)λj ≥ −(n− 1)(M −m)‖λ‖.
Thus, |Ti(λ)| ≤ (n− 1)(M −m)‖λ‖.
Lemma 4 implies that g is Lipschitz continuous with constant K = (n− 1)(M −m).
Lemma 5. If λi = 0 then g(λ)i ≤ 0.
Proof. If x(λ) is a solution to Π(λ) then xi(λ) = 0, as utility functions are strictly
monotonic. Then Ti(λ) = −p(λ) · ωi ≤ 0.
Observe that (x(λ), p(λ), T (λ)) is a Walrasian equilibrium with transfers, as p(λ) is
chosen to satisfy the first-order conditions of all agents with λi > 0, and agents with
λi = 0 are maximizing utility trivially.
Choose a simplicial subdivision of ∆ of mesh ε
K(n−1)2 . This means that if λ and λ
′
are vertexes in the same subsimplex, then ‖λ − λ′‖ < ε
K(n−1)2 . Note that, in that case,
Lemma 4 and the continuity of g implies that ‖g(λ)− g(λ′)‖ < ε
(n−1)2 .
If there is a vertex for which g(λ) ≤ 0 then we are done, as we would have found λ
such that Ti(λ) ≤ 0. In that case,
∑n
i=1 Ti(λ) = 0 implies that T = 0 and we have found
a Walrasian equilibrium. Suppose then that there is no such vertex. That is, for every
vertex λ of the simplicial subdivision, there is an agent i with g(λ)i > 0.
Define a labeling of the subsimplex as follows. Let the label of a vertex λ be the i for
which the transfer to i in g(λ) is largest; i.e. i is the largest component of g(λ) (note it
is strictly positive). If there is more than one, choose the smallest such i. By Lemma 5,
the labeling thus constructed is a proper labeling because if i /∈ χ(λ) then λi = 0 implies
that g(λ)i ≤ 0.
By Sperner’s lemma, there is a completely labeled subsimplex, say λ1, . . . , λn, where
λi is labeled i. Let ηi = g(λi). By construction,
‖ηi − ηj‖ ≤ ε
(n− 1)2 .
Lemma 6. ‖ηi‖ < ε.
Proof. We shall prove that ηii ≤ ε/(n − 1). This suffices to prove the lemma because if
ηij > 0 then η
i
j ≤ ηii ≤ ε; and if ηij < 0 then
∑
h η
i
h = 0 implies that
ηij ≥ −
∑
h:ηih>0
ηih ≥ −(n− 1)ηii ≥ −ε,
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as ηii is the largest value of a component of η
i; so
∣∣ηij∣∣ ≤ ε.
Suppose then, towards a contradiction, that there is i with ηii > ε/(n − 1). Since∑
j η
i
j = 0, there is j with η
i
j < −ε/(n− 1)2. Then,
‖ηj − ηi‖ ≥ ∣∣ηjj − ηij∣∣ ≥ ∣∣ηij∣∣ > ε(n− 1)2
where the first inequality is by definition of ‖‖, the second because ηjj > 0 and ηij < 0.
But ‖ηj − ηi‖ > ε
(n−1)2 contradicts the construction of the subsimplex.
To sum up, the algorithm is as follows:
1. Compute K from the given utilities and endowments.
2. Construct a simplicial subdivision S of ∆ of mesh ε
K(n−1)2 .
3. For each vertex λ of S, calculate g(λ). If g(λ) ≤ 0 then stop (and report an exact
Walrasian equilibrium). If there is i with g(λ)i > 0 then label the vertex by the
smallest i of those with largest g(λ)i.
4. Find a completely labeled subsimplex, say λ1, . . . , λn. This can be done by exhaus-
tive search or by some version of “Scarf’s algorithm.”
5. Report g(λ1) as a Walrasian ε-equilibrium.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 2.
The following lemma is needed to prove both statements in the theorem. It allows the
algorithm to run on a subsimplex in which welfare weights are bounded away from zero.
Lemma 7. Suppose that E satisfies the assumption of bounded endowments. Let η > 0
be such that −Θ + (n− 1)η < 0. Then for all λ ∈ ∆, λi ≤ η implies that g(λ)i < 0.
Proof. Let λ ∈ ∆ \∆η. Let i be such that λi ≤ η. Consider λˆ, defined by
λˆj =
{
λj + λi/(n− 1) if j 6= i
0 if j = i.
Then (by the same argument as in Lemma 5), g(λˆ)i = −p(λˆ)ωi.
Now, ‖λˆ − λ‖ = λi ≤ η, so Lemma 4 implies that ‖g(λˆ) − g(λ)‖ ≤ (n − 1)η. Then∣∣∣g(λˆ)i − g(λ)i∣∣∣ ≤ (n− 1)η; so g(λˆ)i = −p(λˆ)ωi implies that
g(λ)i ≤ −p(λˆ)ωi + (n− 1)η ≤ −Θ + (n− 1)η < 0
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Let ∆η = {λ ∈ ∆ : λi > η}.
We now use the algorithm in the previous section, but modified to run on the simplex
∆
η
. Note that for any boundary λ, λ ∈ ∆η \ ∆η, for all i with λi = η we have that
g(λ)i < 0. The labeling described in the algorithm is therefore a proper labeling.
Let ε′ > 0 be such that ε′ < εη. The algorithm outputs a Walrasian ε′-equilibrium
(x, p). We shall prove that (x, p) is an ε-approximate equilibrium.
Observe that η, and therefore ε′, depend on (n − 1) and Θ. It is therefore constant
across the economies in E.
Let (x, p) be the outcome of the algorithm. Note that since λi ≥ η > 0 for all i we
have that xi ∈ Rl++. Let x∗i be a solution to
maxui(x˜i)
s.t. p · x˜ ≤ p · ωi.
We shall prove that ui(x˜i)− ui(xi) < ε. First, if p · x ≥ p · ωi there is nothing to prove,
as the desired conclusion follows from the definition of Walrasian ε-equilibrium. Let us
then assume that p · x < p · ωi.
By the concavity of ui,
ui(x
∗
i )− ui(xi) ≤ Dui(xi) · (x∗i − xi)
= (1/λi)p · (x∗i − xi)
≤ (1/η)p · ω∗i − p · xi
≤ (1/η)ε′ < ε.
We now proceed to prove that the algorithm finds a strong ε-approximate equilibrium.
Let η be as above, and let ε′ > 0 be such that
ε′ <
εηpi
n
.
The algorithm on the ∆
η
simplex outputs a Walrasian ε′-equilibrium (x, p). Observe that
η and ε′, depend on (n− 1), pi and Θ. It is therefore constant across the economies in E.
Let x∗i be a solution to
maxui(x˜i)
s.t. p · x˜ ≤ p · ωi.
This defines x∗ ∈ Rnl+ . We shall prove that (x∗, p) is a strong ε-approximate equilibrium.
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Define, for 1 ≤ s ≤ l, ys ∈ Rl+ by
ysh =
{
xh if h 6= s
xh +
p·(x∗i−xi)
ph
if h = s.
and θs =
ps·(x∗si−xsi)
p·(x∗i−xi) (here x
∗
si denotes the amount of good s in bundle x
∗, and similarly
for xsi). So
∑
s θs = 1. Then it is easy to verify that
x∗ =
l∑
s=1
θsy
s.
Note that p = λiDui(xi), so Lemma 7 implies that, for any good s, ps ≥ ηpi. Then,
using the expression of x∗ in terms of the vectors ys we obtain:
‖x∗i − xi‖ ≤ sup{
|p · (x∗i − xi)|
ph
} ≤ sup{|p · ωi − p · xi|
ηpi
} < ε
′
ηpi
Then
‖x∗ − x‖ ≤
∑
i
‖x∗i − xi‖ < n
ε′
ηpi
< ε,
where the last inequality follows from the choice of ε′.
References
Anderson, R. M. (1978): “An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem,” Econometrica,
46(6), pp. 1483–1487.
Bewley, T. (1991): “A theorem on the existence of competitive equilibria in a market
with a finite number of agents and whose commodity space is L∞,” in Equilibrium
Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces, ed. by M. Khan, and N. Yannelis. Springer-
Verlag.
Border, K. C. (1989): Fixed point theorems with applications to economics and game
theory. Cambridge Univ Pr.
Chen, X., D. Dai, Y. Du, and S.-H. Teng (2009): “Settling the Complexity of
Arrow-Debreu Equilibria in Markets with Additively Separable Utilities.,” in FOCS’09,
pp. 273–282.
Codenotti, B., S. Pemmaraju, and K. Varadarajan (2004): “The computation
of market equilibria,” ACM SIGACT News, 35(4), 23–37.
17
(2005): “On the polynomial time computation of equilibria for certain exchange
economies,” in Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete
algorithms, pp. 72–81. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
Codenotti, B., A. Saberi, K. Varadarajan, and Y. Ye (2006): “Leontief
economies encode nonzero sum two-player games,” in Proceedings of the seventeenth
annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm, pp. 659–667. ACM.
Codenotti, B., and K. Varadarajan (2007): “Computation of Market Equilibria
by Convex Programming,” in Algorithmic Game Theory, ed. by N. Nisan, T. Rough-
garden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani. Cambridge University Press.
Debreu, G., and H. Scarf (1963): “A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy,”
International Economic Review, 4(3), pp. 235–246.
Deng, X., C. Papadimitriou, and S. Safra (2002a): “On the complexity of equi-
libria,” in Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of com-
puting, pp. 67–71. ACM.
(2002b): “On the complexity of equilibria,” in Proceedings of the thiry-fourth
annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 67–71. ACM.
Devanur, N., C. Papadimitriou, A. Saberi, and V. Vazirani (2002): “Market
equilibrium via a primal-dual-type algorithm,” in Foundations of Computer Science,
2002. Proceedings. The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on, pp. 389–395. IEEE.
Echenique, F., D. Golovin, and A. Wierman (2011): “A Revealed Preference
Approach to Computational Complexity in Economics,” in Proceedings of the ACM
conference on Electronic Commerce.
Eisenberg, E. (1961): “Aggregation of Utility Functions,” Management Science, 7(4),
pp. 337–350.
Jain, K. (2004): “A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Computing the Arrow-Debreu
Market Equilibrium for Linear Utilities,” Foundations of Computer Science, Annual
IEEE Symposium on, 0, 286–294.
Jain, K., and V. Vazirani (2007): “Eisenberg-gale markets: Algorithms and structural
properties,” in Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pp. 364–373. ACM.
Magill, M. (1981): “An equilibrium existence theorem,” Journal of Mathematical Anal-
ysis and Applications, 84(1), 162–169.
Mas-Colell, A. (1986): “The Price Equilibrium Existence Problem in Topological
Vector Lattices,” Econometrica, 54(5), pp. 1039–1053.
18
MasColell, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green (1995): Microeconomic theory, vol. 1.
Oxford university press New York.
Negishi, T. (1960): “Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competi-
tive economy,” Metroeconomica, 12(2-3), 92–97.
Rockafellar, R. T. (1970): Convex Analysis. Princeton Univ Pr.
Scarf, H. (1977): The computation of equilibrium prices: an exposition. Cowles Foun-
dation for Research in Economics at Yale University.
Segal, I. R. (2007): “The communication requirements of social choice rules and sup-
porting budget sets,” Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 341 – 378.
Starr, R. M. (1969): “Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences,”
Econometrica, 37(1), pp. 25–38.
Todd, M. (1976): The computation of fixed points and applications, vol. 1. Springer-
Verlag Berlin.
Vazirani, V. V. (2007): “Combinatorial Algorithms for Market Equilibria,” in Algo-
rithmic Game Theory, ed. by N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani.
Cambridge University Press.
19
